Apparent deviation from the ‘system’

“The trouble is, lean production methods can only ensure quality in mechanical systems. Electronic systems – a marriage of software and electronic hardware – are different. Factory workers can install electronic control modules correctly on each and every car that comes down the line, but they cannot spot deep-seated software or radiation interference problems that might, under very rare circumstances, send one of those cars careening out of control.”
Timothy J. Sturgeon, “Toyota’s Troubles Could Signal Larger Concerns,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 23

“If there is an enduring lesson in Toyota Motor Corp.’s recall fiasco, it is that the Japanese automaker strayed far from the core teachings of [W. Edwards Deming], the influential American statistician and quality-control guru. … It is a production model that would not have tolerated for long the spike in complaints from Toyota owners about sudden acceleration that began in 2002.”
Barrie McKenna, “How Toyota Strayed from the Quality-Control Path and Lost Its Way,” The Globe and Mail, March 16

“Some are pointing at the recent activity at Toyota and saying that lean and the Toyota Production System (TPS) doesn’t work. We say differently, as lean reduces variation, waste, complexity, and the number of suppliers so that you can standardize the product you manufacture. …Where Toyota went wrong was in not following its own playbook.”
Stan Gwizdak and Dennis McRae, “What Went Wrong at Toyota?: In Defense of Lean Manufacturing,” IndustryWeek, March 6

“The values of ‘kaizen,’ or continuous improvement, and eliminating waste, or ‘muda,’ have been taught so widely that they are part of the global business lexicon. … The Toyota way mandates planning for the long term; highlighting problems instead of hiding them; encouraging team work with colleagues and suppliers; and, perhaps most importantly, instilling a self-critical culture that fosters continuous and unrelenting improvement. It’s still unclear if Toyota’s problems were caused by ignoring the principles, or if even following the methodology wasn’t enough to prevent a major quality breakdown at the car maker.”
Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Adherents Defend the Toyota ‘Way,’” The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26

“Toyota revolutionised automotive supply-chain management by anointing certain suppliers as the sole source of particular components, leading to intimate collaboration with long-term partners and a sense of mutual benefit. ... The quality Toyota and its suppliers achieved made possible the ‘just in time’ approach to delivering components to the assembly plant. ... A consequence of Toyota’s breakneck expansion was that it became increasingly dependent on suppliers outside Japan with whom it did not have decades of working experience. Nor did Toyota have enough of the senior engineers, known as sensei, to keep an eye on how new suppliers were shaping up.”
“The Machine that Ran too Hot,” The Economist, Feb. 25

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